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Evidence Corner | The Birthday Column

You say it’s your birthday ...
but could you prove it?
was there at the birth, but try as I might, I3 remember nothing
about it, much less the date on which it occurred. As a newborn, even if a person had some dim memory of the process4
it is impossible to think that s/he popped out, looked up at the
clock, and then used barely-opened eyes to check the calendar
on the wall. hus, by deinition, the birthday girl herself fails
the personal knowledge requirement and a foundation objection should succeed per Rule 602.
If I am not a qualiied witness as to my birthdate, who is?
he only people with actual knowledge of the date and time of
a baby’s birth are those adults who were present at the event.
For sure, my mother was and remembered it well (as I do the
By Cynthia Ford
births of my two children). he medical personnel involved in
the delivery could also testify from their personal knowledge,
he annual photo calendars I make for my long-sufering
but probably don’t retain speciic details as to each of the
family enable me to annotate speciic dates. hus, Sept. 1 says
hundreds of babies they help deliver. In 1954 (I just turned
“Mom’s Birthday Month!;” Sept. 10 says “Time to shop for
63, I think), fathers were not present in the delivery room, but
Mom’s presents;” Sept. 25 “Cake should be chocolate with
could at least testify as to the date on which they irst saw their
1
white frosting;” and Sept. 29 : “MOM’S BIRTHDAY!” But is
newborn, and perhaps give a lay opinion per Rule 701 that
Sept. 29 really my birthday? Could I prove that in court? How?
that was the date of birth.
Surprisingly, this subject has required signiicant contortion
So, to prove a person’s birthdate when it is relevant
in various evidentiary doctrines.
(or essential)5 in a legal proceeding, your best bet to avoid
any evidence objection is to call the person’s birth mother.
The Problem
Pragmatically, this simple solution may not be so simple.
Rule 602 requires personal knowledge by a witness before
Where the mother is dead (sadly, as is my own) or unknown
testifying. “A witness may not testify as to a matter unless
(per older adoption practices) it is impossible to call the
evidence is introduced suicient to support a inding that the
mother. Even where she is known and alive, she may be across
witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” he hearsay
the country or hostile. Last of all, the jury has limited patience,
rule, 802, is the lip side of the same concept: if the basis of a
and may begrudge the time spent on establishing a fact that
person’s testimony is a statement by another person, the tesjurors (and all regular people) regard as a non-issue.
timony is inadmissible. “Hearsay is not admissible except…”
Both rules express the same preference for direct communiThe Fix
cation to the jury by the person who actually perceived the
Fortunately, the law is not an ass,6 ater all. Even before the
event and can recount it, under oath and observation. Most
adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence, state law proof all, the hearsay rule guarantees an opportunity to expose
inaccuracies (or downright lies) through cross-examination,
3 Apparently a few people think they do, but so far most scientiic sources indi“’the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
cate that the development of the brain makes this extremely unlikely or impos2
truth.’”
sible. My basis for the previous sentence is a 10-minute Internet search, using the
I have always “known” my birthdate, but how? No doubt, I highly technical term “memory of birth.” As with all things Google, I could have

Both Montana Rules of Evidence
and Common Law provide practical
work-arounds for proving a
person’s birthdate when it is
relevant in a legal proceeding

1 I know you are reading this after Sept. 29, but don’t despair: you can still catch
me next year, if you calendar now. I like my chocolate dark…
2 John H. Wigmore, quoted in Lilly C. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
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spent hours, if not days, reading each of the articles posted there but I did not.
4 See fn. 3.
5 Statutory rape is the quintessential criminal charge where proof of the ages of
the defendant and victim are key. See, MCA 45-502. On the civil side, it might be
tasteless, but Jim Carey’s cross-examination of his own client in “Liar, Liar” proves
the point: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jQP0Y2T2OQ
6 This phrase is usually attributed to Charles Dickens, in “Oliver Twist” (1838), but
apparently was irst published by George Chapman in a play in 1654. See, http://
www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/the-law-is-an-ass.html.
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vided and continues to provide several practical work-arounds
which incorporate into the law of evidence easy and pragmatic
methods of proving a person’s birthdate.
A. Common Law
In 18987, only nine years ater statehood, the Montana
Supreme Court airmed a conviction of “rape upon a child
of less than 16 years” by her father, Bowser. he defendant
argued that the victim’s testimony as to her own age was
inadmissible hearsay. he Court rejected this view, largely on
practical grounds:
Recent authorities hold that the age of a
prosecuting witness alleged to be under the age
of consent may be proved by her own testimony.
Underh. Cr. Ev. § 342; Whart. Cr. Ev. § 236;
People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915; Bain v.
State, 61 Ala. 75. he fact that the witness derived
her knowledge of her age from statements of her
parents, or family reputation, does not make it
inadmissible. Persons of the age of discretion,
and many who are of even tender years, know
enough of themselves to state their ages with
intelligence and accuracy. Such testimony is
oten essential to prove age, and for this reason
it is competent; being excepted from the rules
generally excluding hearsay evidence.
Bowser also argued that he should have been allowed to
test the basis of the victim’s knowledge of her birth, apparently through voir dire before she gave her direct testimony,
but lost that one too:
[C]ounsel make a point upon the ruling of
the court denying their request to interrogate
the prosecutrix concerning her knowledge of
the fact of her age. But, although the leave to
examine the witness was denied while she was
testifying in response to questions put to her
by the county attorney, it appears that upon
cross–examination defendant’s counsel had full
opportunity to test her knowledge of her age, and
did test it, and thereater moved to strike out all
of the testimony of the witness concerning her
age, because it was hearsay. he ruling of the
court was correct, and no prejudice was done to
appellant’s rights.
In State v. Vinn,8 Vinn was convicted of statutory rape of
his stepdaughter. he girl, Florence, testiied for the prosecution as to her age, saying that she was 17 on the date of the
event charged (another part of the case deals with the admissibility of several similar uncharged events). he defense
disputed her personal knowledge:
She was questioned further as to the sources of
her knowledge, and stated that her mother had
told her of the date of her birth. She also stated
that she had seen the certiicate of her baptism,
which recited the date of her birth. It was

objected that this evidence was not admissible,
because it was hearsay…
he Montana Supreme Court airmed the admission of the
victim’s testimony about her age, despite her lack of personal
knowledge, invoking both Bowser and common law from
other states, which also was based largely on necessity:
he fact that the witness derived her knowledge of her age
from statements of her parents, of family reputation, does not
make it inadmissible. Persons of the age of discretion, and
many who are of even tender years, know enough of themselves to state their ages with intelligence and accuracy. Such
testimony is oten essential to prove age, and for this reason
it is competent, being excepted from the rules generally
excluding hearsay evidence. (Emphasis added)
he court also was untroubled by Florence’s testimony
that she had seen a baptismal certiicate, which showed her
birthdate. Acknowledging that the certiicate itself was probably inadmissible, the court nonetheless found the victim’s
testimony about the contents of the certiicate proper:
It may be conceded… that the baptismal
record was not admissible to prove the date
of the witness’ birth, though it recited this
date. (Citations omitted)…he result of the
examination, however, was not to introduce
the contents of the certiicate, but to disclose to
the jury how, in part, the witness obtained her
knowledge. If the person whose age is in question
may prove it by his own testimony, the fact that
he gains his knowledge from the statements
of his parents or from family reputation does
not render his testimony inadmissible. State
v. Bowser, supra; People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132,
46 Pac. 915. He certainly cannot have personal
knowledge of the circumstances attending his
birth, nor of its date. Neither do we see how
such testimony can be rendered incompetent by
the fact that the same knowledge has also been
gained by the reading of writings in possession
of the family and preserved as records of family
history.
In the same case, Florence’s mother, wife of and witness
for the defendant, testiied that Florence was in fact over 18
on the critical date. here apparently was no objection to
this evidence, because as we have seen above, the mother had
the requisite personal knowledge. However, on rebuttal, the
prosecutor called several rebuttal witnesses to prove that on
other occasions, the mother had told them that Florence was
under 18. he Montana Supreme Court did not diferentiate
between the possible uses of these prior inconsistent statements, but found no problem with their admission, and the
defense apparently did not ask for an instruction limiting the
out-of-court statements to impeachment rather than proof of

7 State v. Bowser, 21 Mont. 133, 53 P. 179 (1898).
8 50 Mont. 27, 144 P. 773 (1914).
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the fact they asserted.9
One of the witnesses who testiied that Mrs. Vinn had
told her Florence was under 18 was the Fergus County
Superintendent of Public Schools. he superintendent’s
testimony went further, and established the foundation for
admission of a school registration document. he judge overruled the defense hearsay objection, and again was airmed
on appeal, under the public records exception: “he document
was a public record required by law to be kept by this oicer. … It was admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.”
State v. Newman10 is to the same legal efect as Vinn
and is a colorful depiction of Butte America in 1930. Chief
Justice Callaway’s recitation of the facts is one of the gems of
Montana jurisprudence:
he story the transcript tells smacks rather of the
early day mining camps than of the Montana of
the present era. Defendant, once before a convict,
ran a dance hall called the Bowery, where he sold
whisky over a “lunch–counter,” and provided
dancing girls who worked upon a percentage
basis. he success of the girls depended upon the
number of drinks they persuaded their partners
to buy. he evidence respecting the conduct of
defendant’s place might serve to bring to the
minds of the oldsters the warning note of the
well–known ballad of the early ’90s, in which the
singer, ater narrating that such things were done
and said on the Bowery, declared he would never
go there any more!
According to the state’s evidence, defendant employed
prosecutrix to work at the lunch counter in the Bowery, but
quickly transferred her to the dance loor, although he knew
that she was but sixteen years of age He insisted upon her
drinking whisky whenever her partner called for drinks at the
bar —which was at the end of each dance. One night when
she was intoxicated defendant took her from the dance loor
to his bedroom where he raped her. he bedroom was connected with the kitchen which adjoined the dance hall. Twice
again he did that. hen he came to stand before a bar himself,
the probability of which he might, with the exercise of a little
sense, have foreseen—the bar of justice, and he must now take
what it dispenses.
In Newman, the convicted rapist was the 16-year-old girl’s
employer, rather than a family member. he family testiied
consistently for the prosecution that she was 16. Despite their
lack of personal knowledge, the defendant did not object to
the testimony of age from the victim or her sister. he only
9 Now, the MRE would allow these prior inconsistent statements as substantive
proof that Florence was indeed 17, not 18. MRE 801(d)(1) provides: “A statement is
not hearsay if: (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testiies at the trial
or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony.” This is one of the
areas in which Montana difers signiicantly from the FRE version, which allows a
prior inconsistent statement for substantive purposes only if the statement “was
given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition,” not the case in Vinn.
10 88 Mont. 558, 294 P. 377 (1930).
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issue on appeal seems to be the admission of the baptism
certiicate produced by the mother, to resolve her confusion
about the exact month of her daughter’s birth, but the defendant failed to object to its admission.
Prosecutrix and her married sister testiied that prosecutrix
was 16 years of age when the alleged ofense was committed,
and that she would not be 17 until Jan. 31, 1930. he sister
said she had told defendant before prosecutrix went to work
for him that the girl was only 16. he mother of prosecutrix,
who spoke English imperfectly, said the girl was 16, was born
in 1913, but was confused as to the month. On cross–examination the witness said she had a paper at home showing
when prosecutrix was born. During a recess, the paper was
procured, and, upon redirect examination, it was ofered;
counsel for defendant saying, “We admit it in evidence.” he
document was a certiicate of baptism, dated Feb. 13, 1913, in
which it was recited that prosecutrix was born Jan. 30, 1913.
It may be that the certiicate would have been excluded had
proper objection been made (State v. Vinn, 50 Mont. 27, 144
P. 773), but defendant’s counsel, having consented to its admission, cannot now urge error.
B. Montana Rules of Evidence
he hearsay exceptions in Montana Rules of Evidence
803 and 804 codify several methods of proving a person’s
birthdate, and thus age, some of which are oral and others
documentary. he key to using these tools is to recognize the
inherent hearsay problem before trial, and then prepare to either avoid it (by calling the mother, see above) or provide the
foundation corresponding to the applicable hearsay exception.
803(4): Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment…. hese usually consist of statements by a patient to a health care provider, who then testiies about those
statements. he Montana Commission Comment observes:
“he guarantee of trustworthiness is provided by the patient’s
motivation for proper diagnosis and treatment.“ he rule
limits the subjects of these statements, but includes statements
of “medical history,” which seems to include statements of a
patient’s age so long as “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment.” here are no Montana cases applying this exception to a statement about a patient’s age, but if the witness/
health care provider testiies that they11 needed the age to
diagnose or treat the patient, this exception should work. Here
is a sample foundation:
Q: Who are you?
A: I am the doctor who treated V.
Q. As part of your ordinary treatment, do you take a medical history from your patient?
A. Yes, always; it is the standard practice for all doctors.
Q. In this case, did you need to know the age of V in order
to treat her appropriately?
A. Yes.
Birthday, page 16
11 It is hard for me to use the plural “they” when I am clearly talking about a
single witness, but old dogs do learn new tricks, and one of my former students
recently wrote convincingly about the need to abandon gender-specifying pronouns. For a better explanation, see, e.g., https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/01/08/donald-trump-may-win-this-years-word-of-the-year/?utm_
term=.a81fd9f76573
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his ACN thus seems to authorize use of a baptism certiicate, including any included statement as to the baptisee’s
birth, to prove birthdate in addition to baptism date. Because
Q. Why?
church records are not self-authenticating, the proponent will
A. Because….
need to call a foundation witness to admit a religious record,
Q. Did you explain why you needed to know how old V
to testify both as to its authenticity and to the foundation facts
was to her/her mother (depending on who transmitted the
of a religion which keeps records:
information)?
Q. Who are you?
A. Yes.
A. I am a minister/rabbi/imam etc. in the church/temple/
Q. What did V/mother say when you asked how old she
mosque etc. of …
was?
Q. Is that a religious organization?
A. She said she was 13.
A. Yes.
803(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilaQ. Does your organization keep regular records of its relitions, in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages,
gious ceremonies and activities?
if the report thereof was made to a public oice pursuant to
A. Yes.
requirements of law.
Q. Do these records include records of the births in memhe only Montana case that applies this exception dealt
bers’ families, including the dates of those births?
with a death certiicate, where the court held that the certiiA. Yes.
cate was admissible to prove the death, but that the informaQ. Do you believe that these records are accurate?
tion that the decedent was a passenger (rather than the driver,
A. Yes.
as the defendant contended) should have been redacted. State
Q. Do your records include a record of the birth of V?
12
13
v. Gould. Montana law requires registration of live births ,
A. Yes.
as well as deaths, so this subsection should apply equally to
Q. Can you identify Exhibit A?
birth certiicates ofered to prove the date of birth. Under an
A. Yes, I can.
th
identical federal version of 803(9), the 9 Circuit held that a
Q. Is that an accurate photocopy of a record in your orgaMexican birth certiicate (properly authenticated14, an entirely
nization’s iles?
diferent issue) was admissible in a criminal case where the
A. Yes.
defendant was convicted of being a deported alien found in
Q. Whose birth record is it?
the United States, although the issue apparently was location
A. V’s.
15
rather than date of birth. U.S. v. Palomares-Munoz.
Q. I ofer Exhibit A. May I publish an enlargement for the
803(11) Records of religious organizations. Statements of
jury?
births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relaQ. According to your record, Exhibit A, what is the date of
tionship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of perbirth of V?
sonal or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of
A. Sept. 29, 1954.
a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certiicates.
he Montana Evidence Commission commented that
Statements of fact contained in a certiicate that the maker
this is a specialized form of the 803(6) “business records”
performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a
exception, but stronger: [religious records have the] “same
sacrament, made by a member of the clergy, public oicial, or
guarantees of trustworthiness as the records admitted under
other person authorized by the rules or practices of a reliException (6). his guarantee is enhanced by the unlikelihood
gious organization or by law to perform the act certiied, and
of false information being provided to religious organizapurporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within
tions.” he federal Advisory Committee Note discusses explica reasonable time thereater.
itly the use of church baptism certiicates to prove age:
his subsection is similar to the preceding one, but deals
However, both the business record doctrine and Exception
with certiicates of events (ceremonies or sacraments), rather
[paragraph] (6) require that the person furnishing the inforthan simply religious records of personal or family history
mation be one in the business or activity. he result is such
facts. Its guarantee of trustworthiness is similar to the public
decisions as Daily v. Grand Lodge, 311 Ill. 184, 142 N.E. 478
records and vital statistics exceptions but: “goes beyond those
(1924), holding a church record admissible to prove fact, date,
exceptions in the area of sacrament and so expands Montana
and place of baptism, but not age of child except that he had
law. Note the certiication procedure requires authentication.
at least been born at the time. In view of the unlikelihood that
See Rule 902.” MT Commission Comment. In the context
false information would be furnished on occasions of this
of proving birthdate/age, this exception seems to apply to
kind, the rule contains no requirement that the informant be
religious ceremonies performed at birth, or other sacraments
in the course of the activity.
administered at speciic ages such as Christian baptism and
conirmation or bar and bat mitzvah in the Jewish religion. I
12 216 Mont. 455, 704 P.2d 20 (1985).
could not ind any Montana case applying this subsection.
13 50-15-221. Birth registration.
he necessary foundation and authentication for the bar
14 Birth certiicates are self-authenticating under M.R.E. 902, so if you obtain the
mitzvah
example would be:
necessary certiication from the public oice which holds them, you should be
able to admit these as exhibits without any witness.
Q. Who are you?
Birthday, from page 14

15 5 Fed.Appx. 709, 2001 WL 219951.
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A. I am the rabbi of Temple Sinai.
Q. Is that a religious organization?
A. Yes, it is a Jewish temple.
Q. Do the rules or practices of your religion authorize you
to perform ceremonies or sacraments?
A. Yes.
Q. Does your religion issue certiicates to relect these ceremonies or sacraments?
A. Yes.
Q. Are these certiicates issued at or near the time the ceremony or sacrament occurs?
A. Yes.
Q. Is a bat mitzvah one of these ceremonies?
A. Yes.
Q. Does a bat mitzvah occur at a certain age?
A. Yes, at 13.
Q. Do you recognize Exhibit B?
A. Yes.
Q. What is Exhibit B?
A. A certiicate of bat mitzvah for V, dated Oct. 1, 1967,
issued by Temple Sinai. his is a photocopy of the certiicate
we have in our iles.
Q. And does Exhibit B show the date of the bat mitzvah of
V?
A. Yes, Sept. 30, 1967.
Q. Does Exhibit B make any statement as to the birthdate
of V?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. What is the date of V’s birthday, according to the bat
mitzvah certiicate?
A. Sept. 29, 1954.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in family Bibles, genealogies,
charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits,
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.
he Montana Evidence Commission commented that (13)
is identical to FRE 803(13), and with Montana law prior to
adoption of the MRE, observing further: “he guarantee of
trustworthiness is provided by the unlikelihood that a false
family record would exist.” he Commission cited a 1915
case, In re Colbert’s Estate16, in which a mutilated family Bible
was admissible, even though neither the trial judge nor the
Supreme Court thought it bore much weight:
he learned trial judge in receiving it said:
“I will admit it in evidence. What weight I will give it is a
matter for future consideration. I don’t like the looks of it.”
With this attitude we are in entire accord. he admissibility of a family Bible containing a family tree or record does
not depend upon authorship or authenticity of the entries; but
upon the fact that it is the family Bible and record, recognized as such by those with whose genealogy or pedigree it is
concerned (People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915; Jones v.
Jones, 45 Md. 144), and for the same reason neither chronological order nor supericial integrity can be a condition to its
reception, whatever efect these circumstances may have upon
its probative value. So, in view of the testimony of Mrs. Beedy
that these entries were made by persons who are now dead
16 51 Mont. 455, 153 P. 1022 (1915).
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and that the Bible and record have always been recognized in
the family of Mrs. Clement as their family Bible and record,
we think it was admissible, though as a factor in respondents’
case it may be worse than worthless.
153 P. at 1026. I have not found any cases on this issue
decided since the M.R.E.
I do have, maybe ghoulishly, an urn containing the
remains of my dear departed Irish wolhound, Fiona, which
states “Best huge17 dog ever, made it to 14 years old!” Under
803(18), the second half of this inscription would be admissible, because it states a fact “concerning personal history.” I
could use it to prove that Fiona18 lived 14 years. he irst half,
the opinion “best huge dog,” does not qualify because it is an
opinion, not a statement of fact, even though it is inscribed on
an urn. he exact evidence would be something like:
Q. Who are you?
A. Cynthia Ford.
Q. Did you have a dog named Fiona?
A. I did, about 40 years ago.
Q. Do you remember how old she was when she died?
A. Not exactly. I think she was pretty old, but I have forgotten exactly how old.
Q. Do you have Fiona’s ashes?
A. Yes, I can’t bring myself to give them up, even though
it’s been years. I guess I should see someone about that.
Q. Do you keep the dog’s ashes in an urn?
A. Yes, I do, and I brought it here today.
Q. Is exhibit A the urn itself?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there an engraving on the urn, Exhibit A?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that engraving state a historical fact as to Fiona’s
age?
A. It does.
Q. Move the admission of Exhibit A.
J. Admitted.
Q. Please read to the jury the second half of the inscription
on the urn.
A. “Made it to 14 years old!”
his out-of-court statement, ofered to prove the dog lived
for 14 years, is admissible even though it is hearsay, because of
803(13).
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history.
Reputation among members of a person’s family by blood,
adoption, or marriage, or among a person’s associates, or in
the community, concerning a person’s birth, adoption, marriage, divorce or dissolution of marriage, death, legitimacy,
relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or
other similar fact of personal or family history.
Under this subsection, a wide variety of witnesses may
testify to a person’s birthdate (and other personal facts) by
recounting the reputation in a designated group about that
fact. he Montana rule is identical to the federal rule, and the
Montana Commission Comments quote the federal Advisory
17 Our household also includes a mid-sized Golden Retriever and a tiny Norwich
terrier, so this distinction is critical to save ofense.
18 I do recognize the argument that “family” might not include pets, but I will
leave that discussion to my fabulous colleague, Professor Stacey Gordon, who has
much more expertise in animal law.
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Notes, which in turn quote Wigmore:
he guarantee of trustworthiness of this and other reputation exceptions that follow is found “when the topic is such
that the facts are likely to have been inquired about and that
persons having personal knowledge have disclosed facts which
have thus been discussed in the community; and thus the
community’s conclusion, if any has been formed, is likely to
be a trustworthy one”. Advisory Committee’s Note, 56 F.R.D.
supra at 317, quoting 5 Wigmore, Evidence, Section 1580 at
444.
he commission noted but accepted the expansion of this
rule from the common law, which restricted such evidence to
family members, to associates and community members. he
topic of this testimony likewise was broadened beyond marriage to include today’s subject, birth, and several other facts.
By analogy to other uses of reputation evidence, the witness needs to be a member of a group in which the reputation
is known. his could be the birthday girl herself, or any other
member of the group, so long as the witness can establish that
there is such a reputation and what it is. Here, for example,
let’s use the victim’s brother:
Q. Who are you?
A. I am V’s brother.
Q. In your family, does everyone have a belief as to V’s
birthday?
A. Yes, we all know when it is and celebrate it then every
year.
Q. Would you call that a reputation within the family?
A. I guess so.
Q. What is the reputation in your family as to V’s
birthday?
A. hat she was born on Sept. 29, two years before me, so
1954.

rule, but these can be used only if the declarant who said “X
was born on Sept. 29, 1954” is unavailable to testify in person.
Rule 804(a) lays out non-exclusive examples of unavailability, including death or illness. Once you have proven that the
declarant can’t be a witness, section 804(b)(4) comes into play
for establishing a birthdate:
(4) Statement of personal or family history.
(A) A statement concerning the declarant’s
own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce or
dissolution of marriage, legitimacy, relationship
by blood, or family history, even though the
declarant had no means of acquiring the personal
knowledge of the matter stated; or
(B) A statement concerning the foregoing
matters, and death also, of another person, if
the declarant was related to the other by blood,
adoption or marriage or was so intimately
associated with the other’s family as to be likely
to have accurate information concerning the
matter declared.

he Montana Evidence Commission Comments note that
MRE 804(b)(4) is substantially identical to the federal version,
and observes:
he distinction between 803(19) and this exception is that
Rule 803(19) allows the same subject matter to be proven
by reputation evidence while this exception relies upon the
declaration of an unavailable witness to prove the same type
of facts. he guarantee of trustworthiness for this exception
is identical to that found for Rule 803(19). … In addition, it
is quite natural for persons to discuss family history among
members of the family or close friends and it is highly unlikely
that falsehood would be repeated in this context.
he unavailable declarant can be the subject herself, under
(A), or someone else either in the subject’s family or very
Although only a few oices regularly celebrate workers’
birthdays, if V is employed at one of those, any of her cowork- close to the family (B). he test is not whether the declarant
had personal knowledge of the birthdate, but whether she was
ers could testify similarly:
“likely to have accurate information” of the date.
A. I am the accounting supervisor at EJ, Inc., and I have
I did not ind any Montana cases applying MRE 804(b)(4),
worked there for ive years.
although there are some federal and other state cases out there
Q. How many other employees are there?
that might be persuasive if you had the irst Montana case.
A. Fiteen.
However, the text of the rule itself provides suicient guidance
Q. Is V one of them?
for the foundation requirements for this hearsay exception.
A. Yes.
he witness is someone who heard the declarant state the subQ. At EJ, Inc., do you celebrate each other’s birthdays?
ject’s birthday. Under A, the declarant was the birthday girl
A. Yes; we like to think of ourselves as a kind of family.
herself. he witness is anyone who heard the birthday girl say
Q. What is the reputation at your oice about when V’s
what her birthday was.
birthday is?
Q. Did you ever hear V say what her birthdate was?
A. Do you mean when do we celebrate V’s birthday?
A. Yes, a million times.
Q. Yes.
Q. Is V here in the courtroom today?
A. On Sept. 29.
A. No.
Q. Is there a reputation for how old V is, what year she was
Q. Do you know why not?
born?
A. Yes, she is in the hospital in labor with her irst baby.19
A. She just turned 63, so 1954. We had 63 candles on the
I drove her there myself this morning. OR Yes, she died last
cake.
Again, I could not ind any Montana Supreme Court cases year. [his is necessary to show unavailability under 804(a)].
Q. What did V tell you about her birthdate?
applying this subsection — maybe you will be the irst to use it
in some case where age is disputed.
MRE 804 provides several other exceptions to the hearsay
19 This basis for unavailability under Rule 804(a), pregnancy, will actually be the
subject of another, much shorter, Evidence Corner column soon.
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A. She was born on Sept. 29, 1954.
Under 804(b)(4)(B), the out of court declarant was someone other than the birthday girl, who was either in the family
or suiciently close to the family that the declarant would
likely have accurate knowledge of the birthday, perhaps an old
family friend. he witness is anyone who heard the declarant
state the birthday of the subject:
Q. Are you related to V?
A. No, but I knew her brother, Ben.
Q. Do you know why Ben is not in the courtroom for this
trial?
A. Yes, he is dead.
Q. Did Ben ever tell you what V’s birthdate was?
A. Yes. He said she was born on Sept. 29, 1954.
Non-hearsay: two more ways to skin the cat: defendant’s
own admission and observation of jury
In the 2014 case of State v. Ghostbear,20 defendant was
convicted of sexual assault. he victim was his girlfriend’s
daughter. Ater the verdict, the trial judge concluded that
the prosecution had failed to establish the age diferential
between defendant and victim which would trigger a felony,
rather than misdemeanor, penalty. he state appealed, and
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for sentencing
as a felony,21 even though the jury did not make a speciic
inding of the ages of the defendant and victim. he majority
described the evidence at trial:
While Ghostbear contends and the District
Court determined that there was no evidence
of his age and the age of the victim, the record
shows otherwise. he State correctly notes that
during trial the District Court admitted into
evidence a recording and a transcript of an
interview of Ghostbear by a law enforcement
oicer. Early in that interview Ghostbear stated
that his date of birth was in 1977, making him 34
years old at the time of the ofense.
In addition, in that same interview Ghostbear
acknowledged that the victim was just turning
age 8, making her age 7 at the time of the alleged
ofense. he victim also testiied that she was
age 8. he jury heard this evidence and was able
to corroborate the respective ages of Ghostbear
and the victim because each of them testiied
at trial. he jurors were entitled to infer from
what they observed that the ages of Ghostbear
and the victim were as he acknowledged them
to be in the admitted interview. he jurors
were instructed that they could consider “the
appearance of the witnesses on the stand.”
he jurors saw, and therefore could consider,
the appearance of Ghostbear as a mature man
and the victim as a child. Ghostbear does not
point to any contrary evidence of age in the
record nor does he argue that there was any
conceivable way that the jury could fail to
conclude that the victim was under the age of 16
20 376 Mont. 500, 338 P.3d 25, 2014 MT 192
21 Justices McKinnon and Baker concurred in the result.
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and that Ghostbear was more than 3 years older.
Ghostbear does not contend that the respective
ages were in any way contested during the trial.
he concurring justices opined that the judge had committed error with regard to charging the jury on the elements of
the crime, but then concluded that the error was harmless:
A.T. testiied that she was eight years old at the time of
trial, making her six or seven at the time of the ofense. In
Ghostbear’s interview with law enforcement, a recording of
which was played at trial, he acknowledged that A.T. was just
turning eight. In addition, he stated that his date of birth was
in 1977, making him 33 or 34 at the time of the ofense. At
trial, Ghostbear was asked, “Did you drink when you were a
kid?” to which he responded, “No, ... I didn’t have a drink of
alcohol until I was 18 years old.”
he evidence of A.T.’s age and Ghostbear’s age
was uncontroverted. he evidence established
that A.T. was roughly six or seven at the time
of the ofense and Ghostbear was three or more
years older than A.T. Indeed, no rational trier of
fact could have concluded that A.T. was over 16
years old or that there was less than a three-year
age diference between A.T. and Ghostbear.
his case demonstrates that if approximate age or a diferential in ages is all that is necessary, rather than an exact date,
the jury may simply consider the appearance of the witnesses
as they testify. To make sure this is clear, the party using this
route should propose a jury instruction based on Ghostbear,
to the efect that “As well as any other evidence on the issue of
age, you are entitled to infer from what you observed during
the trial the age(s) of ______.”
Lastly, the admission of Ghostbear’s own statement as to
the age of the victim by his opponent, the prosecution, also
escaped the hearsay rule and substantively established her age.
MRE 801(d)(2)(A) provides, as sort of a magic wand, that an
out-of-court statement ofered to prove what it asserts is not
hearsay, even though it otherwise exactly its the deinition of
hearsay in 801(c), if that statement was made by the opposing
party:
A statement is not hearsay if…
(2) Admission by party-opponent. he statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own statement…
he Montana Commission comment notes that this
subsection is identical to the FRE. he federal Advisory
Committee Note speciically provides that personal knowledge
by the party-opponent declarant of the fact asserted is NOT
required for admission of his statement:
No guarantee of trustworthiness is required
in the case of an admission. he freedom
which admissions have enjoyed from technical
demands of searching for an assurance of
trustworthiness in some against-interest
circumstance, and from the restrictive
inluences of the opinion rule and the rule
requiring irsthand knowledge, when taken
Birthday, page 28
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with the apparently prevalent satisfaction with
apparently prevalent satisfaction with the results,
calls for generous treatment of this avenue
to admissibility.the results, calls for generous
treatment of this avenue to admissibility.
hus, even if Ghostbear’s lack of actual personal knowledge about the birthdate of the victim would preclude his live
testimony at trial about her age (unless one of the routes explored above applied), it does not bar admission of his out-ofcourt statement on the subject, so long as his opponent ofers

that statement. he lesson here is to scour the information in
your case to see if, anywhere, your opponent has acknowledged the age or birthdate which you must establish. If so:
consider that a present, whether it is your birthday or not.

Conclusion
Consider this column my birthday present to you, whenever your birthday is and however you “know” that. See you
next month, when we will all be a bit older.
Professor Cynthia Ford teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence,
Family Law, and Remedies at the University of Montana’s
Alexander Blewett III School of Law.
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